Greg Detre
Thursday, 15 June, 2000
Prof. Rolls � Prelims Psych
difference between feelings + emotions
body states are inherently ordained to be painful/pleasurable
doesn�t yet explain the subjective phenomenon of consciousness, just by expressing it in purely phys terms
phenomenon > sum of its components + operations
if he�s saying that, he means: only to us, from our
perspective
after all, what is their value?
dissociation � unrelated performance in one area compared to all the rest
just because we don�t have emotions to prompt us, doesn�t �/span> <FW?
but it deprives us of the censure we need to learn/respond/will ourselves � self-improvement
why a collecting habit? unable to assess the value of objects?
R vs L frontal lobe effects?
the choice-making process is different from the options-generating one, because requires an emotional reponse to guide to the correct choice
emotion as the VALUE-GIVER (pg 151)
confused about shifty landscape � working memory
confusingly uses �reason� in the sense of selecting a course of action, as opp to the consciousness inferential sense
is Elliott�s problem simply making the decisions, or also acting on them?
viz Nagel: unable to generate subjective instantiations of mind for self/others???
is anognosic patients� unawareness of own troubes: flattened or contentedly/zennishly unperturbed???
no suffering �/span> same social problems???
axonal �/span> prefrontal/anasognosic areas
Crick � neural substrate for FW
simultaneity of firing of different distributions of neurons �/span> unified sense of consciousness
representation rather than necessarily images
pg
94
the repository of facts + strategies for the manipulation of the images which constitute our thoughts is stored in the form of dispositional representations in the in-between brain sectors
integration by time instead
alternatives � bound in a small/specific spatial area
prefrontal cortices + anterior cingulate (limbic) global attention + working memory
perceptual vs recalled images (Humean???)
including the memory of a possible future
images = from topographic representations in early sensory cortices alone???
under �control of� sensory receptors or �dispositions�???
early = primary cortex? N, = LGN, PUL + COL etc.???
destruction of early sensory cortices � blindsight (because other (higher?) areas remain intact)
achromatopsia = mental images � B+W to (depending on site of lesion, surely?)
fear of selfless cognition? �perpetually recreated neurotic state�
so a neural sef is perceiving whatever the early sensory cortices throw up, either perceptual or recalled images?
damage to early visual sensory cortices �/span> < imagination in colour
dispositional � they order other neural patterns about
dispositional representations � battle stations blueprints for the other neurons (or is it t actual position they take up)
all thought is based on topographically organised representations � that is all that is knowable
convergence zones � where multi-modal sensory information converges
OR the ensemble of neurons whose firing represents a dispositional representation
mere convergence/synchronicity in time for different representations being conjured up is insufficient � need convergence spatially/physically � ganglion with inputs from all these topographical representations in the various early sensory cortices?
what happens if an organism �lost� consciousness while still functioning (skeletal movement etc.)?
what would you notice if you were to ablate the single neuron �seat of consciousness�?
how can/what can: �you construct some meaning� of it?
implicit knowledge: cannot form representations of it in mind
very dodgy explanation of verbal/symbolic/non-abstract thoughts as all representable as topographical representations, for all thought = images
all complex dispositional representations in the association corteices must first be passed through the early sensory cortices as topographical representations
processes/rules governing the deploymnet of our images utilising the rules/stratgies embodied in dispositional resp � essential for thinking but not a content of our thoughts
good summary: pg 70c
abeyantly in �dispositional representations�
tomography
impecunious
support + modulation
what inputs + from where would � a Cartesian theatre???
how does he know we think in images?
dispositional representations vs pattern associators???
convergent zone vs dispositional representation
seems an affliction which affects all the way to conscious + difficult to over-ride
anosognosics are fine with balance, knee jerk + other bodily signals?
insular = the parietal (somatosensory/early sensory cortex)?